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I. Introduction
Vivisection' was practiced only on a small scale prior to
World War II. Since that time, it has mushroomed into a ma-
jor industry which consumes 80 million animals per year in
the United States alone.2 Worldwide, the figure has been esti-
mated at between 125 and 200 million animals per year.3 Bil-
lions of tax dollars have been spent on vivisection.4
Opposition to vivisection has also mushroomed in recent
years. "While in the past the issue of whether research ani-
mals were being abused was discussed by only a handful of
animal rights advocates, today society as a whole is very aware
of the controversy." 5 Organizations opposed to vivisection
have experienced rapid recent growth.6
Every state in the union has adopted some form of anti-
1. Vivisection is defined as any form of animal experimentation especially if con-
sidered to cause distress to the subject. Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary of the English Language Unabridged 2560 (1971).
2. Rowan, A.N., 2 International Journal for the Study of Animal Problems 218
(1981), quoted in Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc'y, The Casebook of Experiments with
Living Animals 9 (1983).
3. Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc'y, The Casebook of Experiments with Living Ani-
mals 9 (1983).
4. National Institute of Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Na-
tional Survey of Laboratory Animal Facilities and Resources, Publication No. 80-2091
(1980), quoted in Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc'y, The Casebook of Experiments with
Living Animals 9 (1983).
5. Chambers & Hines, Recent Developments Concerning the Use of Animals in
Medical Research, 4 J. of Legal Medicine 109 (1983).
6. For example, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), founded
in 1980, now reports 70,000 members. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
Press Release (July 15,1985) (available from the PETA office); The Humane Society
of the United States, founded in 1954, has 315,000 members (Encyclopedia of As-
sociations 901, (20th ed. 1986)); The Animal Legal Defense Fund, founded in 1978,
now has over 300 attorney members. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 1985 Membership
List (unpublished) (available from Animal Legal Defense Fund Office).
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cruelty statute to protect animals from abuse.7 These state
statutes usually take the form of broad prohibitions against
unnecessary cruelty,' sometimes accompanied by exemptions
for conduct such as hunting, fishing, and slaughtering food an-
imals.9 Some states explicitly exempt research facilities from
their anti-cruelty statutes.10 Only Maryland explicitly includes
research facilities in the coverage of its statute. 1 The majority
are silent on the subject.
In addition to these state statutes, the Federal Animal
Welfare Act (AWA),' 2 passed by Congress in 196611 and
7. D. Morretti, Animal Rights and the Law 116-17 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2918(1) (1985).
A person commits the offense of cruelty to animals if, except as authorized
by law, he knowingly:
(a) Abandons any animal;
(b) Subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment;
(c) Subjects any animal in his custody to cruel neglect; or
(d) Kills or injures any animal belonging to another without legal privi-
lege or consent of the owner.
See also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-202(1) (1977).
A person commits cruelty to animals if, except as authorized by law, he
knowingly or with criminal negligence overdrives, overloads, overworks, tor-
tures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly
beats, needlessly mutilates, needlessly kills, carries in or upon any vehicles in
a cruel manner or otherwise mistreats or neglects any animal, or causes or
procures it to be done, or, having the charge or custody of any animal, fails to
provide it with proper food, drink, or protection from the weather, or aban-
dons it.
9. The Delaware statute exempts from the anti-cruelty statute "accepted veteri-
nary practices and activities carried on for scientific research." Del Code Ann. tit. 11,
§ 1325(b) (1974 & Supp. 1984). The Georgia statute provides in relevant part: "This
code section does not apply to the killing of animals raised for the purpose of provid-
ing food nor does it apply to any person who hunts wild animals in compliance with
the game and fish laws of this state." Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-4(b) (1984). The Illinois
statute provides: "Nothing in this Act affects normal, good husbandry practices uti-
lized by any person in the production of food, companion or work animals, or in the
extermination of undesireable pests." Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 8, § 713 (Smith-Hurd 1975 &
Supp. 1985).
10. See supra note 9, Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, ] 13215(b) (1974 & Supp. 1984).
11. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 59 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
12. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2155 (1973 & Supp. 1985).
13. Laboratory Animal Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966).
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amended in 1970,1" 1976,15 and 19851" is designed to insure
that animals intended for use in research facilities are pro-
vided humane care and treatment. 6 For various reasons, espe-
cially enforcement problems, this federal scheme has been
generally ineffective.'
The principle question to be considered in this note is to
what extent research facilities are subject to state anti-cruelty
statutes in the states where they are not specifically ex-
empted. The applicability of anti-cruelty statutes to labora-
tory experiments on animals is generally untested. Depending
on court interpretation, the anti-cruelty statutes could be
sleeping giants, waiting to be used by anti-vivisectionists to
bring humane protections to laboratory animals or they may
be horse and buggy relics which modern courts will refuse to
apply. Taub v. State 8 is the first attempt to apply a general
anti-cruelty statute to specific laboratory conduct. As such, it
deserves attention, not because it resolves the issues raised,
but because it provides a context for analysis and discussion.
II. Taub v. State
Dr. Edward Taub, the appellant in Taub v. State,9 was
the chief scientific investigator in charge of animal research at
the Institute for Behavioral Research in Silver Spring, Mary-
land. The research being conducted involved deafferenting the
limbs of monkeys, that is, severing the nerves in an arm or leg
to abolish all sensation from that arm or leg, and attempting
to train the animal to use the deafferented appendage. The
laboratory was funded by the National Institute of Health
and was periodically inspected by the U.S. Department of Ag-
14. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970).
15. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417
(1976).
15.1. Agricultural Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198 (1985).
16. 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1) (1973 & Supp. 1985).
17. For critiques of the AWA, See, Chambers & Hines, supra note 5 at 117-18,
121-22; Friend, Animal Cruelty Laws, The Case For Reform, 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 201,
215-20 (1974); D. Favre & M. Loring, Animal Law § 9.22 (1983).
18. 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (Md. 1983).
19. Id.
1985]
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riculture. A U.S.D.A. inspection during the relevant period
found no violations.
A complaint about laboratory conditions by an employee
led to an investigation of Dr. Taub's facility by local authori-
ties. On September 11, 1981, a monkey named Nero and six-
teen other monkeys were removed from Dr. Taub's lab by
Montgomery County Police. Nero was in generally good
health but had open and untreated wounds on his deaffer-
ented arm. Dr. Taub was arrested and charged with seventeen
counts of violating the Maryland anti-cruelty statute.20 Each
count related to one of the seventeen primates and each count
contained seven separate allegations of wrong doing. For each
of the primates, Taub was charged with infliction of unneces-
sary pain or suffering, failure to adequately feed, failure to
provide adequate veterinary care, failure to provide proper
drink, failure to provide proper air, failure to provide suffi-
cient space, and failure to provide proper shelter. The Mary-
land district court convicted Taub of failing to provide veteri-
nary care to six of the animals, and acquitted him of all other
charges.21 On appeal, the Maryland circuit court overturned
five of the convictions while upholding the one pertaining to
Nero.22 Taub was an appeal of this one remaining conviction
to the Maryland Supreme Court.23
The Maryland Supreme Court held in the Taub case; the
court "do[es] not believe the legislature intended § 59 of arti-
cle 27 [Maryland's anti-cruelty statute] to apply to this type
of research activity under a federal program. We shall, there-
fore, reverse Dr. Taub's conviction . . 2
III. Preemption
One question raised by the Taub case is whether the Fed-
eral Animal Welfare Act preempts states from regulating the
20. Md. Code Ann. art. 27, § 59 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
21. State v. Taub, Crim. No. 111848-81 (Md. Dist. Ct. Nov. 23, 1981).
22. State v. Taub, Crim. No. 27534 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 30, 1982).
23. Brief for Appellants at 7-19, Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983);
Brief for Appellees at 3-7, Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983).
24. 296 Md. at 444-45, 463 A.2d at 822.
[Vol. 2
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activities of research facilities. This issue received lengthy
treatment by all parties to the case 25 but was not reached by
the court. This issue merits discussion because it is potentially
determinative of the role of states and state statutes in regu-
lating experimental use of animals.
Recent Supreme Court opinions have identified four situ-
ations in which a state statute will be invalidated because of
preemption: (1) Where Congress has explicitly mandated the
preemption, (2) Where Congress has indicated an intent to oc-
cupy the field, (3) Where compliance with both the state and
federal enactments would be impossible, and (4) Where com-
pliance with the state statute would frustrate the purpose of
the congressional enactment. 26 It is the second and fourth of
these situations which merit an in depth examination here.
A. Has Congress occupied the field of regulating laboratory
use of animals?
Appellant argued that the AWA was a comprehensive
federal enactment designed to fully occupy the field of regu-
lating research facilities. 27 There is no doubt that Congress
can preempt state activity by occupying the field.28 The ques-
25. Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 29-37; Brief for Appellees, supra note
23, at 11-15; Amicus Curiae at 9-46, Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983).
26.
When federal preemption is invoked under the directive of the supremacy
clause, it falls to this court to examine the presumed intent of Congress...
Our task is quite simple if, in the federal enactment, Congress has explicitly
mandated the preemption of state law. . . or has adequately indicated an
intent to occupy the field of regulation, thereby displacing all state laws on
the same subject. . . Even in the absence of such express language or implied
congressional intent to occupy the field, we may nevertheless find state law to
be displaced to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such
actual conflict between state and federal law exists when compliance with
both federal and state regulations is physically impossible. . . or when state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. [citations omitted]
Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union,
- U.S. -, -, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3185-86 (1984).
27. Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 34-36.
28. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). But see Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal
Power, 45 U. Colo. L. Rev. 51 (1973-74) and Engdahl, Some Observations on State
1985]
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tion is whether Congress did so in this case. Appellant relied
primarily on the specificity of regulations adopted under the
AWA2 9 to show "a scheme of federal regulations so pervasive
as to leave no room for the states to supplement it."30
Appellee's position against preemption rests on Con-
gress's specific recognition of the existence of state law in this
area and endorsement of its continued existence.31 The appel-
lees further supported their position that Congress did not in-
tend to preempt state law with the holding of the Supreme
Court of Colorado in Winkler v. Colorado Department of
Health.32 Even though the AWA comprehensively regulates
the transport of animals, Winkler held that the AWA did not
preempt a state law governing transport of animals.
This author finds the argument against preemption to be
the more persuasive one. The AWA, when enacted, was not
sufficiently comprehensive to preempt the field. The AWA
covers treatment of animals before and after but not during
research procedures. The AWA covers certain warm blooded
animals, but no cold blooded animals, and other warm
blooded animals only upon a finding by the secretary.33 The
AWA covers research facilities which are federally funded or
which buy or ship animals "affecting commerce," '34 but this
definition excludes the majority of research facilities. Statis-
tics on the scope of the AWA provided during debate on
adoption of the AWA exemplify the narrow applicability of
the statute:
and Federal Control of Natural Resources, 15 Houston L. Rev. 1201 (1978) arguing
that Congress lacks the power to preempt in areas where their power to regulate is
implied, not express.
29. For example, federal regulations governing non-human primates specify min-
imum cage sizes, feeding frequencies, watering frequencies, ventilation, sanitation,
etc. 9 C.F.R. § 3.75-3.91 (1985).
30. Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 34.
31. "The secretary is authorized to cooperate with the officials of the various
States or political subdivisions thereof in carrying out the purposes of this chapter
and of any state, local, or municipal legislation or ordinance on the same subject." 7
U.S.C. § 2145(b) (1973 & Supp. 1985).
32. 193 Colo. 170, 564 P.2d 107 (1977).
33. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (1973 & Supp. 1985).
34. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(e) (1973 & Supp. 1985).
[Vol. 2
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Of the 11,000 laboratories in the United States, approxi-
mately 2,000 will be covered by H.R.13881 [The Labora-
tory Animal Welfare Act of 1966]. . . Of the hundreds of
millions of animals consumed by the laboratories, the bill
will, at most, bring its limited benefits to 5 million...
[E]ven these limited benefits of housing and care stop
when research starts, and once that determination is
made, protection for the animal ceases under the terms of
the legislation.. 5
Further, preemption by occupying the field is seldom es-
tablished simply by the scope of a federal statute.36 It is com-
mon for Congress to enact complex systems of regulation, not
as the last word on a subject, but as a minimum level upon
which the states are encouraged to build." Congress included
language in the AWA encouraging cooperation between the
federal government and the states.3 8 This language would be
consistent with a congressional intent to establish a floor upon
which the states may build, and inconsistent with an intent to
preempt the field.
B. Does state regulation of laboratory animals frustrate
congressional intent?
Appellant's second preemption argument was ,that the
AWA was intended, in part, to protect research from outside
interference. Appellant argued that any attempt by a state to
35. 112 Cong. Rec. 19,608; 112 Cong. Rec. 19,559. Subsequent amendments have
expanded the scope of the AWA (see supra notes 13-15), but these amendments do
not affect the preemption discussion. If the Act as originally passed did not displace
state law, it is hard to see how incremental changes in the Act's scope could have that
effect.
36. "It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supercede the
exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of the intention
to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed." New York
State Div. of Soc. Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973), quoting, Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
37. See Resource Conservation & Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982);
Resource Conservation & Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1982) (authorization of
state programs). See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1982);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982) (authorization of state programs).
38. See supra note 31.
19851
7
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
regulate laboratories would frustrate Congress's purpose and
would therefore be invalid.3 9 Support for this position appears
in the legislative history for the 1966 Act.
We have diligently tried to bring back to the House an
effective bill which will codify the noblest and most com-
passionate concern that the human heart holds for those
small animals whose very existence is dedicated to the ad-
vancement of medical skill and knowledge while at the
same time still preserving for the medical and research
professions an unfettered opportunity to carry forward
their vital work in behalf of all mankind.40
The appellant also found support for his position in the legis-
lative history of the 1970 amendment to the AWA, which
stated that "[t]he bill in no manner authorizes the disruption
or interference with scientific research or experimentation.
Under this bill the research scientist still holds the key to the
laboratory door. '4 1
These passages show that Congress did not intend the
AWA to interfere with actual research. They do not necessa-
rily show that Congress intended to prevent the states from
interfering with actual research. The 1966 history speaks of
the AWA preserving, not creating or expanding, an unfettered
opportunity to carry on research, yet in 1966 every state had
an anti-cruelty statute. While these statutes varied in their
stringency and applicability to research facilities, the words
chosen by Congress are inappropriate to express an intent to
displace this state patchwork. Since the passage of the AWA
in 1966 marked the first federal effort to protect laboratory
animals, it seems likely that it was freedom from federal regu-
lations, not all regulations, that was being "preserved".
The passage from the 1970 debate quoted above states
that the bill does not authorize interference with research and
39. Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 32-33.
40. Conf. Rep. No. 1848, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2635, 2649.
41. H.R. Rep. No. 1651, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5103, 5104.
[Vol. 2
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under this bill the scientist retains the key to the laboratory
door. The 1970 language seems to apply only to the 1970
amendments. Congress's words indicate that in 1970 they
were leaving unchanged their 1966 decision not to protect ani-
mals during actual experimentation. Congress gave no indica-
tion that in 1970 their objective was to oust the states from
the field of laboratory animal protection or that they consid-
ered the states already ousted by the 1966 act.
If Congress had wished to preclude state regulation of
laboratory research, an unambiguous provision to that effect
could have been made. Instead, Congress precluded the misin-
terpretation of the AWA by clarifying the purpose of that bill
but stopped short of the language which would be necessary
to bar the states from the field.
Having determined that the AWA should not be read as
preempting state involvement in the regulation of research fa-
cilities, the next inquiry is whether Maryland in particular,
and other states in general, became involved in regulating re-
search facilities when they passed general anti-cruelty
statutes.
III. State Legislative Intent
A. Maryland
As previously noted,42 the Maryland Supreme Court ruled
in Taub that the Maryland anti-cruelty statute did not apply
to research facilities. While this ruling can be criticized on
procedural grounds, 43 it is the substance of the holding which
42. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
43. The issue of whether or not the anti-cruelty statute applied to research facili-
ties was not raised or decided at the trial court level and was not raised or briefed by
either party on appeal. If the Maryland court believed this issue to be crucial, they
could have asked the parties to brief it so the court would have a record on which to
base their opinion. Also, Maryland Rule 813 states that the scope of appellate review
is "ordinarily" limited to questions raised and decided by the trial court. In Taub, the
court writes, "as the rule employs the term 'ordinarily', it permits exceptions and we
have occasionally decided cases on issues not previously raised. See, e.g., Squire v.
State, 280 Md. 132, 368 A.2d 1019 (1977); Bartholomey v. State, 260 Md. 504, 273
A.2d 164 (1971). . .Martin G. Imbach, Inc. v. Deegan, 208 Md. 115, 117 A.2d 864
(1955). Because our conclusion as to this issue is completely dispositive of the case,
1985]
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is relevant to this discussion.
At the inception of the Taub case, the Maryland anti-cru-
elty statute4' set up three different standards of care, each to
be used in appropriate situations. The general rule, applicable
in most cases, is the "unnecessary" standard. Under this rule,
a person who "inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain upon the
animal, or unnecessarily fails to provide the animal with nu-
tritious food in sufficient quantity, necessary veterinary care,
proper drink, air, space, shelter or protection from the
weather is guilty of a misdemeanor. (emphasis added)' 5
The second standard is the "most humane method" stan-
dard. It applies to "activities in which physical pain may un-
avoidably be caused to animals, such as food processing, pest
elimination, animal trapping, and hunting."' "4 This standard is
we shall consider it." Taub, 463 A.2d at 820, 296 Md. at 441-42. The three cases cited
by the Taub court all involved situations where, due to a quirk of timing or other
extraordinary events, it would work a substantial injustice on the parties not to allow
the hearing of a new issue on appeal. The Taub court presents no extraordinary cir-
cumstances, merely the statement that the new issue would be dispositive of the case.
Such a holding leaves every party free on appeal to raise any new argument. The
mere finding that it is dispositive of the case would make it admissible in the appeals
court.
44. The full statute read:
Any person who (1) overdrives, overloads, deprives of necessary sustenance,
tortures, torments, cruelly beats, mutilates or cruelly kills; or (2) causes, pro-
cures or authorizes these acts; or (3) having the charge or custody of an
animal, either as owner or otherwise, inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain
upon the animal, or unnecessarily fails to provide the animal with nutritious
food in sufficient quantity, necessary veterinary care, proper drink, air, space,
shelter or protection from the weather, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment not to ex-
ceed 90 days, or both. Customary and normal veterinary and agricultural
husbandry practices including but not limited to dehorning, castration, dock-
ing tails, and limit feeding, are not covered by the provisions of this section.
In the case of activities in which physical pain may unavoidably be caused to
animals, such as food processing, pest elimination, animal training, and hunt-
ing, cruelty shall mean a failure to employ the most humane method reasona-
bly available. It is the intention of the General Assembly that all animals
shall be protected from intentional cruelty, but that no person shall be liable
for criminal prosecution for normal human activities to which the infliction of
pain to an animal is purely incidental and unavoidable.
Taub, 296 Md. at 442-43, 463 A.2d at 821.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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violated when a person fails to use the "most humane method
reasonably available. '4 7
The third standard is the "total exemption" standard.
This applies only to "customary and normal veterinary and
agricultural husbandry practices. 4 8 These practices are to-
tally exempt from the Maryland anti-cruelty statute.
The first standard is the general rule. The second stan-
dard applies to an open class of activities. A court may decide
that a new type of conduct involves unavoidable pain and
therefore should be judged by the second standard. The third
standard applies to a closed class of activities. Only veterinary
and animal husbandry practices receive total exemption from
the statute's operation.
By finding laboratory research to be exempt from the
Maryland anti-cruelty statute, the Maryland Supreme Court
applied the third standard to an activity not listed in the stat-
ute. If there is a construction of the statute which supports
their viewpoint, the court did not reveal it. The legislature
named the activities that were to be exempt. The rationale of
the Maryland Supreme Court was that the legislature could
not have intended to interfere with research. This rationale
does not justify the court's decision. If research were placed in
the second category, any experimental procedure could be car-
ried out if there was no more humane way of accomplishing
the same result. Such a standard would appear to be entirely
acceptable since science is in no way advanced by permitting
the inhumane procedure when there exists a humane way to
conduct the same research. In Taub, the failure to provide
Nero with veterinary care in no way advanced the scientific
purpose of the research. To the contrary, the lack of veteri-
nary care led to the amputation of the very appendage Dr.
Taub wished to study. Thus, science might well have been ad-
vanced by holding Dr. Taub to a stricter standard of humane
care.
The Maryland legislature apparently agrees that it is rea-
sonable to require humane behavior from researchers. Follow-
47. Id.
48. Id.
19851
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ing the Taub decision in 1983, Maryland became the only
state in the nation to expressly include research facilities in
the coverage of their state anti-cruelty statute. The new pas-
sage reads, "It is the intention of the General Assembly that
all animals, whether they be privately owned, strays, domesti-
cated, feral, farm, corporately or institutionally owned, under
private, local, state, or federally funded scientific or medical
activities, or otherwise being situated in Maryland shall be
protected from intentional cruelty."49 The substantive portion
of the Taub opinion has thus been legislatively overruled.
B. Other States
The common law gave animals no protection against cru-:
elty. 0 Prior to this century, there were few anti-cruelty laws,5 1
but by the early 1920's most, if not all, of the states had some
form of anti-cruelty statute.52 The early statutes made no
mention of laboratory research, but they did generally exempt
from the statutes pain inflicted for lawful purposes and with
justifiable intent. 3 In 1961, the American Law Institute (ALI)
published a draft model penal code section on cruelty to ani-
mals.54 This tentative draft was approved by the ALI in 1962
and has since been included in the Model Penal Code and re-
mained unchanged. The Model Penal Code section provides:
A person commits a misdemeanor if he purposely or
recklessly: (1) subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment;
or (2) subjects any animal in his custody to cruel neglect;
or (3) kills or injures any animal belonging to another
without legal priviledge or consent of the owner. Subsec-
tions (1) and (2) shall not be deemed applicable to ac-
cepted veterinary practices and activities carried on for
scientific research. 55
49. Md. Code Ann. art. 27, § 59 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
50. Model Penal Code § 250.11 comment 1 (1980).
51. D. Morretti, Animal Rights and the Law 1 (1984).
52. 2 H. Brill, Cyclopedia Criminal Law § 844 (1923).
53. 2 H. Brill, Cyclopedia Criminal Law § 852 (1923).
54. Model Penal Code § 250.6 (Tentative Draft No.13 1961).
55. Model Penal Code § 250.11 (1980).
[Vol. 2
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The last sentence of the model code section is explained in
the comments as follows:
There remains the critical question whether the pain or
suffering inflicted was unjustifiable. This issue can not be
further refined and in any event is adequately suggested
by the word "cruel". In light, however, of the wide differ-
ences of view as to when pain or death may justifiably be
imposed on animals, it is at least necessary to exempt the
professionally accepted practices of veterinarians and sci-
entific researchers. Section 250.11 does so explicitly."'
It can be presumed that state legislatures are aware of the
Model Penal Code provision and of the possibility of exempt-
ing research activities. However, of the eight states which
have adopted at least part of the Model Penal Code formula-
tion," four have chosen not to adopt the scientific research
exemptions and one adopted it only to later repeal it.59 In all,
twenty-seven states have modified their animal cruelty stat-
utes since the Model Penal Code provision was adopted in
1962 without including an exemption for research activities.6
56. Id. comment 2.
57. Id. at 428 and n.13. (Ala., Ariz., Del., Or., Pa., Mass., Mich., W. Va.)
58. Id. at 428 and n.15. (Ala., Ariz., Or., Mich.)
59. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5511 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1985).
60. The 27 state statutes, and the year most recently modified are: Ala. Code §
13A-11-14 (1982) (1978); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2910 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (1978);
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2918 (1985) (1985); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-9-202, 35-42-112
(1981) (1977); Fla. Stat. § 828.12 (1976 & Supp. 1985) (1971); Idaho Code § 18-2102
(1979 & Supp. 1985) (1972); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 8, § 704 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp.
1985) (1973); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-46-3-2 (Burns 1985) (1985); Iowa Code Ann. § 717.2
(West 1979 & Supp. 1985) (1978); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 525.130 (1985) (1984); Md. Code
Ann. art. 27, § 59 (1982 & Supp. 1985) (1984); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.272, § 77
(West 1970 & Supp. 1985) (1968); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 752.21 (1968 & Supp. 1985)
(1975); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 343.20-.36 (1985) (1985); Mont. Code Stat. § 45-8-211
(1981) (1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1002 (1979) (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 574.100
(1981) (1981); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:8 (1974 & Supp. 1983) (1983); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 30-18-2 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-360 (1981 & Supp.
1985) (1979); N.D. Cent. Code § 36.-21.1.-02 (1971 & Supp. 1985) (1975); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 959.13 (1968 & Supp. 1984) (1977); Or. Rev. Stat. § 167.850 (1983)
(1973); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5511 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1985) (1984); R.I. Gen.
Laws 1 4-11-2 (1976 & Supp. 1985) (1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 16.52.070 (1962 &
Supp. 1986) (1979); Wyo. Stat. § 11-29-102 (1977 & Supp. 1985-1986) (1978).
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There are, in addition, seven other states with older statutes
which do not expressly exempt research. 1
In all, thirty-four states have rejected any express exemp-
tion for researchers. They rely on statutes functionally similar
to the Maryland statute discussed in Taub. Being aware of
the possibility of expressly exempting scientific research, and
choosing not to add scientific research to their list of exempt
activities, these thirty-four states have apparently chosen to
treat researchers in the same way they treat other non-ex-
empted activities. An additional nine states and the District
of Columbia deal expressly with scientific research but stop
short of a blanket exemption such as the one in the Model
Penal Code. At least eight of these provisions postdate the
Model Penal Code.6 2 Only seven states have provided a blan-
ket exemption for scientific research, such as the one proposed
in the Model Penal Code.
In short, the Taub decision, the response of the Maryland
legislature, and the reactions of most states to the Model Pe-
nal Code suggest that it would be a mistake for a court to
imply an exemption for researchers if a state's legislature has
not expressly created one.
IV. Conclusion
The Taub case raised several new and interesting ques-
tions about state anti-cruelty statutes. Are they, in part, pre-
empted by federal law? Do they apply to research facilities?
What requirements do they place on research facilities? The
answers to those questions will determine whether anti-cru-
61. The seven state statutes are: 53 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 247 (West 1960 & Supp.
1985); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:2361 (1973 & Supp. 1985); Miss. Code Ann. § 94-41-1
(1972); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1685 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984-1985); S.C. Code
Ann. § 47-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3-104 (1982
& Supp. 1985); W. Va. Code § 61-8-19 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
62. These statutes are: Alaska Stat. § 11.61.140 (1983); Cal. Penal Code § 599c
(1970 & Supp. 1985); D.C. Code Ann. § 22-812(b) (1981 & Supp. 1985); Hawaii Rev.
Stat. tit. 37, § 711-1109 (1976 & Supp. 1984); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4310 (1981 &
Supp. 1984); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 510 (1983 & Supp. 1985); N.J. Rev. Stat.
§ 4:22-16 (1973 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 353 (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 40-1-16 (1977 & Supp. 1984); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 13, § 403 (1974 & Supp. 1985).
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elty statutes are sleeping giants to be used by animal rights
advocates to reshape laboratory procedures, unimportant pro-
visions used only to intervene in the event of wanton sadism
outside the professions, or something in between.
The answers given in the Taub case are merely indicative
of a misinterpretation of legislative intent. It is this author's
,opinion that state anti-cruelty statutes are not preempted by
the AWA, and that if a state anti-cruelty statute does not spe-
cifically exempt researchers, those researchers can be con-
victed for unreasonable and unjustifiable infliction of pain and
suffering to animals but not for reasonable or justifiable acts.
It is for the trial courts to determine on a case by case basis
whether specific conduct is reasonable. In Taub, the trial
court found Dr. Taub's conduct to be unreasonable. That
finding should have been upheld.
Larry Falkin
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